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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Vincent Stewart pied guilty to one count of felony 
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. He received a unified 
sentence of four years, with one year fixed. The district court initially placed Mr. Stewart 
on probation, a condition of which was to complete mental health court; however, after 
he was found to have violated his probation, the district court revoked his probation but 
reinstated him back on probation. Over 6 weeks later, the district court held a hearing 
during which the district court revoked Mr. Stewart's probation; however, Mr. Stewart 
was not present at the hearing and did not waive his right to be present. 
On appeal, Mr. Stewart asserts that the district court deprived him of his 
constitutional right to due process by revoking his probation at a hearing held in his 
absence. Mr. Stewart further contends that the district court abused its discretion in 
revoking his probation, and in failing to reduce his sentence, sua sponte. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
On September 16, 2010, a probation officer performed a home visit on 
probationer Vincent Stewart. (R., pp.8-10.) After additional law enforcement officers 
arrived to assist in the search of Mr. Stewart's home, they located drug paraphernalia 
containing methamphetamine residue, and Mr. Stewart had, on his person, one pill for 
which he did not have a prescription. (R., p.9.) Based on these facts, Mr. Stewart was 
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charged by information with one count of possession of a controlled substance, 
methamphetamine.1 (R., pp.19-20.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Stewart pied guilty to possession of a 
controlled substance.2 (R., pp.26-30.) As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed 
to dismiss the two misdemeanor charges in the companion case, misdemeanor battery 
and failure to appear charges in Canyon County case number 2010-26233, and to 
recommend mental health court. (R., pp.26-30.) The district court accepted the plea 
and set the matter for sentencing. (R., p.29.) 
Mr. Stewart was screened for acceptance into Canyon County Mental Health 
Court and found to be eligible. (R. pp.26-27.) At the sentencing hearing, the district 
court sentenced Mr. Stewart to an aggregate unified term of seven years, with three 
years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Stewart on probation for four 
years with one of the conditions of probation that he attend and successfully complete 
mental health court.3 (R., pp.34, 37-39.) 
In 2012, a report of probation violation alleged that Mr. Stewart violated the terms 
and conditions of his probation by being charged with new crimes, and by being 
terminated from mental health court. (R., pp.73-92.) On December 19, 2012, 
Mr. Stewart admitted to violating those conditions of his probation. (R., p.99.) On 
1 In the instant case, Mr. Stewart was charged with one count of possession of a 
controlled substance, methamphetamine. (R., pp.19-20.) In Canyon County case 
number 2010-27196N, Mr. Stewart was charged with one count of misdemeanor 
possession of drug paraphernalia and one count of misdemeanor unlawful possession 
of a prescription. (R., p.21.) 
2 At this time, Mr. Stewart also pied guilty to one count of misdemeanor domestic battery 
in Canyon County case number 2010-28429*N and to one count of misdemeanor petit 
theft in Canyon County case number 2020-26233*N. (R., p.29.) 
3 On the misdemeanor charge of domestic battery, Mr. Stewart was sentenced to ninety 
days in jail with credit for ninety days already served. (R., p.33.) The district court set 
out sentencing for the petit theft charge. (R., p.33.) 
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March ?, 2013, the district court revoked and then reinstated Mr. Stewart's probation for 
a period of three years, with the same terms and conditions as previously ordered, 
including the condition that Mr. Stewart complete Canyon County Mental Health Court. 
(3/7/12 Tr., p.16, L.19 - p.17, L.18; R., pp.116-119.) The district court advised that if 
Mr. Stewart was not accepted back into Mental Health Court program, that would be a 
violation of the program and the court would have to "do something differently." (3/7/12 
Tr., p.17, Ls.4-8; R., p.117.) The district court entered an order revoking Mr. Stewart's 
probation and placing him back on probation for three years. (R., p.119.) 
On March 26, 2013, the State filed a report of probation violation which alleged 
that Mr. Stewart violated the terms and conditions of his probation by being denied as a 
participant in the mental health court program. (R., pp.122-123.) The report further 
alleged that Mr. Stewart falsely informed the district court that he would be allowed to be 
a participant in the program again.4 (R., p.122.) Defense counsel filed two motions 
seeking to have Mr. Stewart transported to the probation disposition hearing; however, 
the district court denied the motion and Mr. Stewart was not transported from the prison 
for his hearing. (R., pp.124-131; 4/19/13 Tr., p.20, Ls.1-5.) On April 19, 2013, the 
district court revoked Mr. Stewart's probation during a hearing at which Mr. Stewart was 
not present. (R., pp.132-134; 4/19/13 Tr., p.19, L.1 - p.21, L.10.) On May 13, 2013, 
4 The report accused Mr. Stewart of "manipulating the court into believing he was going 
to be placed back into the Mental Health Court program." (R., p.122.) The report 
advised that Mr. Stewart was formally denied acceptance back into the program on 
March 13, 2013-yet he was sentenced to mental health court on March 7, 2013, so it is 
not clear from the record how Mr. Stewart "manipulated" the court as it appears that he 
did not yet know that he was not accepted back into the program at the time of his 
probation violation disposition hearing. (R., pp.116-117, 122.) 
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Mr. Stewart filed a Notice of Appeal.5 (R., pp.147-150.) Mr. Stewart appeals from the 
order revoking probation. (R., pp.142-143.) 
5 Mr. Stewart also filed a motion for leniency under I.C.R. 35. (R., pp.139-141.) On 
appeal, Mr. Stewart does not challenge the denial of his Rule 35 motion, as there was 
no new information presented in conjunction with his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.139-141, 
144-146.) The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 
motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or 
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 
35 motion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). "An appeal from the denial of 
a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent 
the presentation of new information. Id. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court violate Mr. Stewart's constitutional right to due process when 
it revoked Mr. Stewart's probation in his absence? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Stewart's 
probation? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to reduce Mr. Stewart's 




The District Court Violated Mr. Stewart's Constitutional Rights To Due Process When It 
Revoked His Probation In His Absence 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Stewart asserts that the district court violated his constitutional right to due 
process when it revoked his probation outside his presence. Because doing so was a 
violation of Mr. Stewart's constitutional right, the order revoking his probation must be 
vacated, with the case remanded for a new hearing at which Mr. Stewart will be present. 
B. The District Court Violated Mr. Stewart's Constitutional Right To Due Process 
When It Placed Him On Probation Outside His Presence 
Idaho Criminal Rule 33( e) states: 
The court shall not revoke probation except after a hearing at which the 
defendant shall be present and apprised of the ground on which such 
action is proposed ... The court shall not revoke probation unless there is 
an admission by the defendant or a finding by the court, following a 
hearing, that the defendant willfully violated a condition of probation. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
A probationer is entitled to due process throughout probation revocation 
proceedings. State v. Kelsey, 115 Idaho 311,314 (1988); State v. Done, 139 Idaho 635, 
637 (Ct. App. 2004 ). A probationer must be given a due process hearing before 
probation can be revoked. Kelsey, 115 Idaho at 314. At the hearing, satisfactory proof 
of a violation of a probation condition or "any other cause satisfactory to the court" must 
be proven. Id. citing I.C. §§ 19-2602, 20-222. 
In Done, the Idaho Court of Appeals explained the due process rights that must 
be provided to probationers: 
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[B]efore probation can be revoked, a probationer must be given a due 
process hearing. Throughout probation revocation proceedings, the 
probationer is entitled to due process. The probationer is entitled to be 
present at the hearing and may be entitled to counsel. The probationer 
must be afforded the opportunity to be present and rebut evidence and to 
call and cross-examine witnesses. Prior to the hearing, the probationer 
must be given adequate notice of the grounds for revocation. 
Done, 139 Idaho 635, 636-637 (internal citations omitted). 
On March 7, 2013, the district court revoked Mr. Stewart's probation but 
reinstated him back on probation. (3/7/13 Tr., p.16, L.20 - p.17, L.3.) The district court 
entered an order to that effect on March 22, 2013. (R., p.119.) Six days later, the State 
filed a Petition for Probation Violation which alleged that Mr. Stewart violated his 
probation by being denied as a participant in mental health court. (R., pp.120-123.) 
Notably, the Petition for Probation Violation advised Mr. Stewart, inter alia: 
By this petition, the probationer is advised of certain rights, to-wit: 
1. That the Defendant has a right to a hearing after having been 
informed and having reviewed the alleged probations [sic] 
violations; 
2. That the Defendant has the right to be present at the proceedings 
against the Defendant and has the right to testify on their own 
behalf. 
R., pp.120-121.) The district court scheduled a "review hearing," opted not to transport 
Mr. Stewart despite the two defense motions requesting his transport to the hearing, 
found that Mr. Stewart had violated one of the conditions of his probation, and revoked 
Mr. Stewart's probation in his absence. (4/19/13 Tr., p.19, L.1 - p.21, L.1 O; R., pp.124-
135, 142-143.) 
Thus, Mr. Stewart was never arraigned on the new allegation that he violated his 
probation violation and was never asked whether he admitted or denied the truth of the 
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allegation.6 Further, the district court found that he had violated the terms of his 
probation without any evidence of such-the court did not hear testimony from any 
witnesses or consider any evidence other than the Report of Probation Violation. (See 
generally 4/19/13 Tr.) Ultimately the district court relied solely on the assertions of the 
prosecuting attorney when it found that Mr. Stewart had violated his probation. 
Revoking Mr. Stewart's probation outside his presence violated Idaho Criminal 
Rule 33, and his Idaho and federal constitutional rights to due process. In order to 
remedy this violation, the district court's order revoking Mr. Stewart's probation should 
be vacated, with this matter remanded for an admit/deny hearing at which Mr. Stewart 
will be present. 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Mr. Stewart's Probation 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Stewart asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked 
his probation, because the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal 
standards. Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e), a district court may revoke probation 
only for a willful violation of a condition of probation. I.C.R. 33(e). The probation 
violation at issue was non-willful as whether or not Mr. Stewart was allowed re-entry into 
mental health court was beyond his control. 
6 It is not clear from the record whether Mr. Stewart even received notice of the alleged 
probation violation. If Mr. Stewart was not notified of the violation, such cannot serve as 
the sole basis for revoking probation. See State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918 (Ct. App. 
2003) (holding that where probationer was not notified of certain alleged probation 
violations, proof of their breach could not serve as the sole basis for revoking probation). 
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B. Applicable Standards Of Review 
Appellate courts use a two-step analysis in reviewing a probation revocation 
proceeding. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102,, 105 (2009). First, the appellate court 
determines "whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation." Id. "If it is 
determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation, the second 
question is what should be the consequences of that violation." Id. 
"A district court's decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on appeal 
absent a showing that the court abused its discretion." Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105. In 
reviewing a district court's discretionary decision, appellate courts conduct an inquiry "to 
determine whether the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted 
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with the applicable legal 
standards, and reached its standards by an exercise of reason. Id. 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Mr. Stewart's Probation, 
Because It Did Not Act Consistently With The Applicable Legal Standards 
Mr. Stewart did not admit to violating his probation. The district court found, 
without hearing testimony or evidence to establish a violation, that Mr. Stewart had 
violated his probation by being denied re-entry into mental health court. (R., pp.132-
134; 4/19/13 Tr., p.19, L.1 -p.21, L.10.) 
The applicable legal standard the district court must use to determine whether to 
revoke probation depends on whether the violation was willful or non-willful. Id. "If a 
knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, a district court's decision 
to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Id. (quoting State v. 
Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001 )). In deciding whether revocation of 
probation is the appropriate response to a violation, the court considers whether the 
9 
probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continued probation is 
consistent with the protection of society. State v. Jones, 123 Idaho 315, 318 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
When the district court revoked Mr. Stewart's probation, the applicable legal 
standard from I.C.R. 33(e) permitted the district court to revoke probation only for a 
willful violation of a condition of probation. The district court found that Mr. Stewart had 
not been allowed re-entry into Canyon County Mental Health Court and had been 
sentenced to prison in an Ada County case; thus, because successful completion of 
mental health court was one condition of his probation, he could not perform the 
condition and thus revocation was appropriate. (4/19/13 Tr., p.19, L.14 - p.20, L.5.) 
However, the district court did not find whether the violation was willful, and the State 
did not show that the alleged violation was willful. Thus, the district court abused its 
discretion when it revoked Mr. Stewart's probation. 
The State has the burden of showing that a probation violation was willful. See 
State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 382 (Ct. App. 1994 ). Before the recent amendment to 
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e), the standard for revoking a non-willful probation violation 
was, "if a probationer's violation of a probation condition was not willful, or was beyond 
the probationer's control, a court may not revoke probation and order imprisonment 
without first considering alternative methods to address the violation." Id. (quoting 
Leach, 135 Idaho at 529). 
However, the current version of I.C.R. 33(e) states: "The court shall not revoke 
probation except after hearing at which the defendant shall be present and apprised of 
the grounds on which such action is proposed" and "[t]he court shall not revoke 
probation unless there is an admission by the defendant or a finding by the court, 
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following a hearing, that the defendant willfully violated a condition of probation." I.C.R. 
33(e) (emphasis added). Because the current version of I R. 33(e) uses the language 
"shall not," the restriction it imposes is mandatory. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 
758, 760 (2002) (quoting Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848 (1995)). Thus, if a violation 
of a condition of probation is non-willful, a district court may not revoke probation. See 
I.C.R. 33(e). 
While Idaho's appellate courts have not yet interpreted the current version of 
I.C.R. 33(e), Idaho case law from before the effective date of the amendment indicates 
that a probation violation is non-willful where the probationer was not at fault or had no 
control over the violation. See, e.g., Lafferty, 125 Idaho at 380, 382 (holding that the 
record was insufficient to show that a probationer willfully violated his probation, where 
the probationer, who was certified as one-hundred percent disabled, was involuntarily 
terminated from a halfway house program because he was unable to perform the 
carpentry work required as part of the program). 
Conversely, Idaho's appellate courts have held that a probation violation is willful 
where the probationer is responsible or at fault for the violation. See, e.g., State v. 
Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that substantial evidence existed 
to show that a probationer willfully violated his probation conditions, where the 
probationer missed a meeting with his probation officer, failed to contact the officer for 
several days because he was staying with friends and using drugs and alcohol at the 
time, and failed to attend a substance abuse program); State v. Fife, 114 Idaho 103, 
104-06 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the record supported the district court's finding of a 
willful probation violation, where firearms were found at a probationer's home after the 
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probationer was informed he could not possess firearms and he indicated that he 
understood that condition). 
Mr. Stewart was denied re-entry into mental health court. Such was a condition 
beyond his control-he was not responsible or at fault for being denied re-entry. The 
district court erred when it determined that Mr. Stewart violated his probation by being 
denied re-entry into mental health court, because this was not a willful violation and, 
pursuant to I.C.R. 33(e), the district court could not have revoked Mr. Stewart's 
probation unless the violation was willful.7 
111. 
The District Court, When It Revoked Mr. Stewart's Probation, Abused Its Discretion By 
Executing His Underlying Sentence Without Any Reduction 
Mr. Stewart asserts that when the district court revoked his probation, it abused 
its discretion by executing his underlying sentences without any reduction. "When a trial 
court revokes a defendant's probation, the court possesses authority under I.C.R. 35 to 
sua sponte reduce the sentence. The decision whether to do so is committed to the 
discretion of the court." State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 672 (Ct. App. 1998). Here, 
the district court erred when it ordered Mr. Stewart's underlying sentence into execution 
without any reduction. 
"A sentence is reviewed by [an appellate court] for an abuse of discretion. The 
reasonableness of a term of imprisonment must be measured against the sentencing 
7 Alternatively, even if the district court had discretion to revoke probation for non-willful 
violations, the district court still abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Stewart's 
probation, because it did not adequately consider alternative methods to address 
the violation as required by Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105 {holding that "if a probationer's 
violation of a probation condition was not willful, or was beyond the probationer's 
control, a court may not revoke probation and order imprisonment without first 
considering alternative methods to address the violation"). 
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goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution." State v. Chavez, 
134 Idaho 308, 314 (Ct. App. 2000) (citation omitted). When reviewing an excessive 
sentence claim, appellate courts "conduct an independent review of the record, focusing 
on the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." Id. Review of a 
sentence executed after the revocation of probation is not based "upon the facts 
existing when the sentence was imposed. Rather, [appellate courts] examine all the 
circumstances bearing upon the decision to revoke probation and execute the sentence, 
including events that occurred between the original pronouncement of the sentence and 
the revocation of probation." Id. "A sentence will not be reduced on appeal unless it is 
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts." Id. 
Here, Mr. Stewart did well on probation-he was employed and was actively 
managing his mental health by using what he was learning from mental health court. 
(3/7/13 Tr., p.11, Ls.3-23.) For a year and one-half, Mr. Stewart did well in mental 
health court-he was in Phase IV of mental health court and only months away from 
graduation-until his wife got a domestic violence charge, and Mr. Stewart was not 
allowed to have contact with her. (3/7/13 Tr., p.15, Ls.20-23; R., p.76.) After this 
incident, Mr. Stewart drove, which resulted in new driving convictions, and used 
methamphetamine and, as a result, was eventually suspended from mental health 
court. (3/7/13 Tr., p.8, Ls.20-23, p.9, Ls.1-7; R., p.76.) 
Mr. Stewart asserts that the district court abused its discretion in finding that his 
probation violation justified revocation. 
The final question to be answered in a probation revocation proceeding, is what 
prison sentence should be imposed? State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 
2001 ). After a probation violation has been established, the district court may order the 
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suspended sentence to be executed, but the court is also authorized under Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27 
(Ct. App. 2009). The standard of review and factors considered in such a decision are 
the same as those used for the initial sentencing. Id. 
Even if the district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Mr. Stewart's 
probation, it did abuse its discretion by not reducing his sentence sua sponte, even if 
only in recognition of his successful efforts on probation to that point. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, where a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997). 
Mr. Stewart does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. 
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Stewart must show that in light 
of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. 
One factor supporting Mr. Stewart's rehabilitative potential is the fact that he has 
strong support from his family. Mr. Stewart's mother is very supportive of him and wrote 
a letter to the district court. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSl),8 p.9.) 
Mr. Stewart's grandparents also wrote a letter to the court in support of their grandson. 
(PSI, p.17.) Mr. Stewart has a daughter from a previous relationship and had a 
newborn son at the time of his original sentencing. (PSI, pp.10-11.) At his disposition 
on March 7, 2013, Mr. Stewart told the district court that he was through making bad 
decisions as he needed to be there to raise his children. (3/7/13 Tr., p.15, Ls.2-3.) 
8 The PSI contains references to several documents that were purportedly attached to 
the PSI, such as supportive letters, evaluations, and medical records, yet the 
documents referenced therein did not accompany the PSI. Appellate counsel has made 
multiple requests for the documents, but the district court has been unable to locate the 
referenced documents. 
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Mr. Stewart is very motivated to provide for his family. (PSI, p.15.) See State v. 
Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who had the 
support of his family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts). 
Mr. Stewart took accountability for his wrong decisions-he realized that he had 
put too much on his plate. (3/7/13 Tr., p.11, Ls.7-9.) While in mental health court, 
Mr. Stewart was attending Stevens-Henager College because he wanted to be a drug 
and alcohol counselor. (3/7/13 Tr., p.13, Ls.10-15.) Mr. Stewart told the district court at 
his disposition hearing that he wanted to become a drug and alcohol counselor "to be 
able to help guys like me and women like me that have mental health illnesses as well." 
(3/7/13 Tr., p.13, Ls.11-13.) Further, Mr. Stewart also had a full time job while in mental 
health court. (3/7/13 Tr., p.11, Ls.21-23.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires 
the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. 
State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). Mr. Stewart suffers from Bipolar Disorder, but is 
stable on his medications and has learned tools from his counselor to better be able to 
slowdown his mania. (3/7/13 Tr., p.9, Ls.8-22, p.12, Ls.3-19; PSI, p.11.) 
Further, between the time Mr. Stewart was arrested on the October 17, 2012 
probation violation warrant and his reinstatement on probation on March 7, 2013, 
Mr. Stewart made some positive progress that would warrant a reduction of sentence. 
Mr. Stewart displayed significant improvement in his conduct during his incarceration at 
the Canyon County Jail. (3/7/13 Tr., p.15, Ls.7-19.) Mr. Stewart took advantage of his 
incarceration to participate in programming. (3/7 /13 Tr., p.8, Ls.15-16; Certificates of 
Completion, attached to the Motion to Augment filed 4/1/14.) Further, although 
Mr. Stewart's behavior in jail was initially poor, he improved his behavior and had 
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numerous positive notes in his file. (3/7/13 Tr., p.8, Ls.15-19; Canyon County Detention 
Center Inmate Incarceration Record, attached to the Motion to Augment filed 4/1/14.) 
Jail deputies noted a "dramatic improvement in Mr. Stewart's behavior while 
incarcerated" and commended his worth ethic. (Canyon County Detention Center 
Inmate Incarceration Record, attached to the Motion to Augment filed 4/1/14.) They 
dubbed him a "model inmate" and noted that he was respectful to other inmates and 
staff while incarcerated. (Canyon County Detention Center Inmate Incarceration 
Record, attached to the Motion to Augment filed 4/1/14.) Jail deputies also noticed the 
changes in Mr. Stewart-his newfound focus and goals for the future. (Canyon County 
Detention Center Inmate Incarceration Record, attached to the Motion to Augment filed 
4/1/14.) 
In light of all of the mitigating evidence that was presented to the district court 
that demonstrates Mr. Stewart's significant rehabilitative potential, the district court 
abused its discretion when it failed to sua sponte reduce his sentence because his 
sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Because the district 
court did not adequately consider mitigating factors such as Mr. Stewart's mental 
condition and the fact that he successfully completed up to Phase IV of mental health 
court, the district court abused its discretion when it ordered into execution Mr. Stewart's 
sentence without any reduction. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Stewart respectfully requests that this Court remand this case with an order 
that Mr. Stewart be placed back on probation. Alternatively, he requests that his case 
be remanded to the district court for a hearing at which Mr. Stewart would be present. 
DATED this 1st day of April, 2014. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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